Denmark’s upcoming parliamentary election takes place amid rising concerns about foreign disinformation, with security services warning of likely Russian interference. Recent elections across Europe show how AI-generated content, fake social media networks, and coordinated campaigns have targeted voters, though Denmark appears more resilient than many neighboring countries.
New Technology Creates New Vulnerabilities
The 2026 Danish election unfolds in a vastly different technological landscape than previous campaigns. Artificial intelligence tools now allow anyone to create convincing fake videos, photos, and audio recordings quickly and cheaply. These capabilities have already been deployed in several European elections over the past three years, sometimes with dramatic consequences.
Chatbots and Deepfakes Enter the Political Arena
This marks the first Danish parliamentary election where chatbots and deepfake technology pose significant threats. Flemming Splidsboel, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, emphasizes the unprecedented nature of this campaign. People can now produce synthetic content with minimal cost or technical expertise, he notes.
The geopolitical situation adds another layer of complexity. A recent threat assessment from Danish intelligence services PET and FE, along with the Agency for Societal Security, warned that foreign powers may attempt to influence the election. Russia appears particularly interested in weakening Danish support for Ukraine, while the MAGA movement in the United States could seek to shape attitudes toward the Danish Commonwealth.
Citizens More Aware Than Before
Despite these elevated threats, Splidsboel believes Danes generally approach information critically. Many actors want to influence Danish voters, but awareness has grown significantly in recent years. The attempts to manipulate public opinion will likely be greater than ever before, yet citizens are better prepared to recognize and resist such efforts.
Denmark’s information environment appears relatively robust compared to other European nations. Security services reported no systematic or coordinated foreign disinformation during the June 2024 European Parliament elections, a stark contrast to the experiences of countries in Southern and Eastern Europe.
France Confronts QR Code Conspiracy Theories
The French presidential election in April 2022 demonstrated how simple administrative changes can fuel elaborate conspiracy theories. The introduction of QR codes on voting cards triggered widespread misinformation campaigns across social media platforms.
False Claims About Voter Registration
Rumors spread rapidly on Twitter and Facebook that the QR codes would register individual voters. Some posts falsely claimed that Dominion Voting Systems, the company baselessly accused by Donald Trump of rigging the 2020 U.S. election, would delete votes cast against Emmanuel Macron. None of these allegations held any truth.
The QR code was identical on all voting cards and simply directed users to the Interior Ministry’s website for election information. Nevertheless, the false narrative gained significant traction online, showing how technical innovations can be weaponized to undermine confidence in democratic processes.
Yellow Vests Targeted by Hoaxes
Another widespread falsehood claimed that 22,500 participants in the Yellow Vest protest movement had been stripped of their voting rights. The movement’s own lawyers debunked this claim, but it continued circulating on social media. The election took place shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, yet a report from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue found that direct influence from Russian state media remained limited.
However, narratives supporting Russian talking points, such as conspiracy theories about bio-labs in Ukraine, appeared in online groups alongside COVID-19 misinformation and election fraud claims. This pattern showed how marginal actors exploit various events to nurture distrust in democratic institutions.
EU Election Reveals AI-Generated Campaign Material
The European Parliament election in June 2024 marked a turning point in the use of artificial intelligence for political campaigning. Several candidates deployed AI-generated content without proper disclosure, violating ethical guidelines.
Italian Politician Shares Fabricated Images
Matteo Salvini, a right-wing politician from Italy’s Lega party, posted an AI-generated image depicting Muslims burning Dante Alighieri’s “Divine Comedy.” Investigations by The Digital Forensic Research Lab and Alliance4Europe exposed this and similar cases. Political groups in the EU Parliament had signed ethical guidelines requiring clear labeling of AI content, yet violations occurred throughout the campaign.
The election also brought attention to hidden influence networks. Latvian EU parliamentarian Tatjana Ždanoka faced accusations of collaborating with Russia’s FSB intelligence service. A media investigation involving Swedish newspaper Expressen and Russian outlet The Insider revealed emails suggesting Ždanoka received instructions from FSB contacts.
Agent for Peace or Foreign Influence
Ždanoka denied being a Russian agent, declaring herself an agent for peace instead. She had voted against condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, raising further suspicions. Latvian security services opened an investigation into her activities. The case illustrated how influence can take many forms beyond digital manipulation.
Splidsboel points out that interference may involve synthetic materials produced in Russia or individuals acting on Russian behalf through social media and street activism. The EU election demonstrated this diversity of tactics, a pattern that could emerge in the Danish parliamentary campaign.
Romania Annuls Presidential Election After TikTok Campaign
The most dramatic example of election interference came from Romania in November 2024. Pro-Russian nationalist candidate Călin Georgescu achieved a stunning victory in the first round of presidential voting, despite having no visible campaign infrastructure or funding.
Massive Social Media Network Exposed
Georgescu’s online presence featured videos of him riding horses and practicing judo on TikTok. Behind this seemingly organic popularity lay a sophisticated operation. Documents from Romanian security services revealed a network of more than 2,000 Facebook pages and 25,000 automated TikTok accounts boosting his content.
Prosecutors identified one individual suspected of paying over 1 million euros to more than 100 influencers to support Georgescu. The scale and coordination of the campaign prompted Romania’s constitutional court to annul the election results. The country’s top prosecutor concluded that Georgescu benefited from a massive Russian influence operation.
Wake-Up Call for European Security
Splidsboel describes the Romanian election as a stark awakening for European security services. The incident showed that Russia could intervene very deliberately to influence electoral outcomes. Georgescu now faces charges of participating in an attempted coup against the Romanian state, allegations he denies.
A new election has been scheduled, but the damage to public confidence in democratic processes may prove harder to repair. The Romanian case stands as the most extreme example of foreign electoral interference in Europe since 2022, demonstrating capabilities that could theoretically be deployed elsewhere.
Germany Targeted by Fake News Network
In the months leading up to Germany’s February 2025 parliamentary election, a sprawling disinformation apparatus targeted multiple candidates. More than 100 fake news websites spread false stories about German politicians, according to investigations by Correctiv and NewsGuard.
Green Party Candidates Face Fabricated Scandals
Robert Habeck, the Green Party’s lead candidate, was falsely accused of sexually assaulting a woman. Then Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock supposedly met with a gigolo during African trips, according to other fabricated stories. One particularly absurd claim suggested the government had agreed to bring 1.9 million Kenyans to Germany.
German authorities attributed the campaign to Storm-1516, a Russian group linked to the GRU military intelligence service and the Internet Research Agency troll farm in Saint Petersburg. The head of Germany’s domestic intelligence service BfV told Le Monde that the campaign showed how democratic systems face concrete attacks.
Coordinated Operation Across Platforms
The disinformation network operated across multiple platforms, creating an ecosystem of false information that reinforced itself through cross-references between fake sites. This sophisticated approach made debunking more difficult, as fact-checkers faced a constantly expanding web of fabricated stories. The Russian embassy in Berlin denied all involvement, calling the accusations groundless and absurd.
The German case demonstrated how foreign actors can exploit the open nature of European media environments. False narratives spread before they could be effectively countered, potentially shaping voter perceptions even after debunking efforts succeeded.
Ireland Faces Deepfake Video Days Before Vote
Just days before Ireland’s October 2025 presidential election, a sophisticated deepfake video appeared on Facebook and YouTube. An AI-generated version of independent candidate Catherine Connolly announced her withdrawal from the race in what appeared to be a news broadcast from RTÉ, Ireland’s national broadcaster.
Convincing Fabrications Fool Experts
The fake video looked remarkably authentic. Barry Scannell, an advisor to the Irish government on artificial intelligence, admitted he needed to check other news sources to verify whether the withdrawal was real. Other fabricated RTÉ broadcasts showed invalid ballots and claimed the election had been canceled.
Meta and Google eventually blocked the content, but not before the videos accumulated thousands of views and shares. The incident revealed how deepfake technology has reached a level of sophistication where even experts struggle to immediately identify fabrications. RTÉ confirmed the videos were entirely fake.
Origins Remain Unknown
Authorities have not identified who created the deepfake videos targeting the Irish election. This uncertainty itself carries implications for future campaigns. Without attribution, deterrence becomes nearly impossible. The Ireland case shows that relatively small-scale operations using readily available technology can threaten electoral integrity.
Connolly ultimately won the election despite the fake video, but the incident highlighted vulnerabilities that will persist in future campaigns. The ease of creating convincing deepfakes means similar attacks could occur in any democratic election, including Denmark’s.
Denmark’s Position in the European Context
While these five examples show serious threats to electoral integrity across Europe, Denmark appears somewhat insulated from the worst effects. Analysis of 278 election-related hoaxes detected across 20 EU countries from May through June 2024 found that Northern Europe accounted for only 1.4 percent of cases.
Regional Disparities in Disinformation
Southern Europe experienced 41.7 percent of detected hoaxes, while Eastern Europe saw 31.4 percent during the 2024 European Parliament campaign. The concentration of disinformation in these regions reflects targeted efforts by foreign actors and domestic populist movements. Denmark’s minimal share suggests a more resilient information environment.
Several factors contribute to this relative protection. Denmark ranks highest in the EU for press freedom, scoring 89.60 out of 100 according to Reporters Without Borders. Strong media literacy and public awareness create barriers against disinformation campaigns. Danish security services maintain vigilant monitoring while assessing actual threats realistically.
Continued Vigilance Required
Nevertheless, Danish authorities take the threat seriously. The recent assessment from PET and FE explicitly warns about possible Russian attempts to exploit the election. Splidsboel advises citizens to remain particularly cautious with social media content, questioning who stands behind posts and being alert for AI-generated materials before sharing or commenting.
The contrast between Denmark’s experience and countries like Romania or Germany offers some reassurance but no grounds for complacency. Technology continues evolving, making disinformation campaigns easier to execute. The geopolitical tensions driving foreign interference show no signs of abating. Denmark’s resilience must be actively maintained through awareness and critical thinking.
Sources and References
The Danish Dream: Denmark’s local elections could reshape national politics
The Danish Dream: Denmark braces for cyberattacks on election day
The Danish Dream: Russian hackers target Denmark in cyber attack threat
DR: Overblik: Fem valg i Europa, der blev udsat for misinformation eller skjult påvirkning
Disinfo.eu: European Digital Media Observatory
EDMO: European Digital Media Observatory
Cogitatio Press: Media and Communication Research
