Russia and USA Target Denmark’s Election Now

Irina

Writer

March 4, 2026
11:18 am

Danish intelligence agencies have raised the threat level for foreign election interference ahead of the March 24 parliamentary election. Russia is now considered very likely to target Denmark with disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks, while American pro-Trump networks may also try to influence voters through social media.

Denmark’s intelligence services have issued their starkest warning yet about foreign interference in a Danish election. For the first time, agencies describe Denmark as a self-standing priority target for Russian influence operations rather than just collateral damage in broader campaigns against the West.

The shift marks a significant escalation in how seriously Danish authorities view the threat to democratic processes. The warning comes as Denmark heads toward a parliamentary election that could determine the country’s stance on issues ranging from Ukraine support to Greenland’s future.

Intelligence Agencies Sound the Alarm

The Police Intelligence Service, the Defense Intelligence Service, and the Agency for Societal Security issued a joint threat assessment on February 27. The report warns that Russia will very likely attempt to manipulate Danish voters through coordinated disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks during the election period.

From Low Risk to High Alert

The change in threat level is dramatic. During the 2022 parliamentary election and 2024 European Parliament election, intelligence services considered Russian interference in Denmark less likely. Even during municipal and regional elections in November 2025, the threat was assessed as low.

Only six months later, the assessment has completely changed. Military analyst Jeanette Serritzlev from the Royal Danish Defense Academy says the new language represents a major departure from previous evaluations. The agencies now explicitly state that Denmark has become a prioritized target in its own right.

Ukraine Support Drives Russian Focus

Denmark’s extensive military and financial support for Ukraine explains much of Russia’s increased attention. The country has committed significant resources to Ukrainian defense, including allowing weapons production on Danish soil. These actions have made Denmark a more prominent adversary in Russian strategic calculations.

The intelligence assessment identifies specific goals for Russian operations. Moscow wants to weaken Danish public support for Ukraine, create internal divisions, and undermine trust in democratic institutions. These objectives align with broader Russian efforts to fracture Western unity on the war.

Methods and Tactics of Influence

Russian influence operations use multiple tactics to shape Danish public opinion. Intelligence services describe a coordinated approach that combines digital manipulation with attempts to exploit existing social divisions.

Social Media Manipulation and Fake Profiles

False narratives spread through fake social media profiles represent a primary concern. These accounts amplify divisive content, inject misleading information into comment sections, and create an artificial sense of controversy around key issues. The goal is not necessarily to convince people of specific positions but to generate confusion and distrust.

Pro-Russian hackers will very likely attempt smaller scale cyberattacks during the campaign period, according to the assessment. These attacks could target party websites, political infrastructure, or media outlets covering the election. While major disruptions to voting systems are considered less probable, even minor technical problems could undermine public confidence.

Targeting Specific Candidates and Parties

The threat assessment explicitly warns that interference could focus on individual candidates and political parties. Operatives might spread fabricated stories about politicians, manipulate images or videos, or coordinate harassment campaigns against specific figures.

Denmark has prior experience with such tactics. A Russian woman involved with the Liberal Alliance party and peace movement activists received funding from Moscow through the Pravfond foundation to spread anti-Western propaganda. These cases demonstrate how foreign influence can penetrate Danish political circles.

American Networks Add New Dimension

The threat does not come exclusively from traditional adversaries. The intelligence assessment identifies potential interference from actors connected to American political movements, particularly networks associated with the MAGA environment.

Greenland Tensions Create Opening

President Trump’s repeated statements about wanting to acquire Greenland have created opportunities for influence campaigns. The intelligence services note that misinformation and disinformation about the Kingdom of Denmark spread following these statements, potentially creating uncertainty around the election.

These influence attempts may come from private individuals or networks around the MAGA movement without formal ties to the American administration. The decentralized nature of such operations makes them harder to track and counter than state-directed campaigns.

Lessons from Greenland’s Election

Evidence of American influence already exists from Greenland’s parliamentary election in March 2025. A report from Nordic Safe Cities documented how Trump and his supporters successfully influenced debate in Greenland during that campaign.

Trump Jr.’s visit to Nuuk in January 2025 created significant polarization among Greenlanders, according to the report. While most Greenlanders opposed American acquisition, the controversy generated lasting divisions about how to handle the situation and Greenland’s relationship with Denmark. These divisions persisted on social media well after the election ended.

Government Response and Preparedness

Danish authorities have activated coordinated measures to protect the election from foreign interference. A specialized task force brings together multiple government agencies to monitor threats and respond to incidents.

Task Force Coordinates Defense

The Influence Task Force includes representatives from the Justice Ministry, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and Greenland’s government. This cross-governmental structure allows rapid information sharing and coordinated responses to emerging threats.

The task force focuses on protecting voting infrastructure from cyberattacks and countering disinformation campaigns. Its work builds on experience from the November 2025 municipal elections, when pro-Russian distributed denial of service attacks targeted Danish systems.

Long Term Effects Beyond Election Day

Experts emphasize that the damage from influence operations extends beyond determining which party forms the government. Serritzlev notes that the real goal is creating lasting noise and feelings of division that persist after March 24.

Successful influence campaigns undermine trust in institutions, deepen political polarization, and make democratic consensus harder to achieve. Even if foreign actors fail to change vote totals, they succeed if they make Danes doubt the legitimacy of the electoral process or deepen existing social rifts.

The challenge for Denmark lies in defending democratic openness while remaining vigilant against manipulation. Intelligence services can identify threats, but ultimately voters must navigate an information environment where not all sources are what they appear to be.